ABSTRACT As a novel network architecture, information-centric networking (ICN) has a good performance in facilitating content sharing among users. Although in-network cache used in ICN can effectively solve the problem of network congestion. Meanwhile, it also brings a lot of challenges such as security and privacy issues during data transformation. Some of the current solutions are based on the traditional encryption technology, but these solutions introduce significant overhead in the client side and have a high requirement to the memory and computing power of end user. In this paper, we use an efficient proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme in ICN framework to help reduce the overhead on the user-side while guaranteeing flexible data sharing between subscribers and even their cooperator. Our proposal has the additional benefits of a noninteractivity and collusion resistance. We also prove that our scheme is secure against adaptive replayable adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (RCCA) in re-encryption and chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure in complete ICN encryption. Our analysis of this program also shows that the scheme has a relatively good performance in computation cost and communication complexity aspects.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the explosive growth of smart devices and the popularity of many innovative social networking applications, network traffic volume has been growing exponentially. This demand of increasing traffic volume and ultra-low latency have fostered information-centric networking (ICN) in the research community [1] - [4] as a new paradigm. ICN is an approach to shift the Internet infrastructure away from endto-end communications between hosts based on perpetual connectivity, to finding and delivering information according to users' interests. In ICN architecture, content owners publish the content and assign the unique name to each content. These contents can be duplicated and stored in the network using network caches [5] , [6] . Subscribers do not need to know the content owner's physical location (the IP address), the name of content is used for retrieving the nearest content. This design enables contents being efficiently delivered to consumers. Though the network cache used in ICN is efficient in solving the problem of network congestion, it also brings
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Kuo-Hui Yeh. great challenges to security issues during content transformations. Networks carry all kind of information, even including private personal data or important confidential business information. In many situations, the release of sensitive data may cause a tremendous loss. These adverse effects will be the unlimited expanded in ICN network architecture with high-efficient transmission characteristics.
Encrypting content before publishing it to the ICN network can assuage most of the security and privacy concerns. Nevertheless, traditional forms of encryption are not convenient for sharing content with other specific users. When the subscriber in ICN access control framework intends to share its content with a specified non-subscriber (subordinate or cooperation partner), s/he must download and decrypt the corresponding data and then re-encrypt the data with the recipient's public key. This poses significant communication and/or storage overhead for a subscriber, negating the ICN network advantage. Fortunately, the same goal can be achieved more efficiently by using Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) [7] . The concept of PRE was proposed by Blaze et al. [8] to avoid the cumbersome decryption-then-encryption approach in traditional forms of encryption. Specifically, PRE enables a semi-trusted proxy to convert a message encrypted with the delegator's public key to another ciphertext, which can be directly decrypted by the intended delegate with his own private key. More importantly, this proxy has no access to the corresponding plaintext or delegator's secret key during the transformation process. Such a PRE implementation is a natural fit for data sharing in an ICN network.
In this paper, we proposed a PRE scheme in ICN framework to solve the problem of security issues during content transformations and realize flexible access control [31] , [35] . Meanwhile, this PRE scheme integrates with Shamir's Secret Sharing method and Publish/Subscribe Networking content distribution service to transmit content efficient and mitigate the user-side's computation burden.
In detail, the two situations for content sharing in our scheme are introduced as follows:
Content Sharing With Subscribers: Subscribers included in the user registration list have access to a content item provided by the content provider. The content provider should execute the three steps as follow: (1) generates an access control policy for registered users, and assigns to this policy a set of subscribers that can access the content, (2) encrypts the content item using a Shamir's Secret polynomial secret constant and the router's share, i.e., generates encrypted enabling block, and (3) sends the enabling block to the storage router.
Content Sharing With a Subscriber's Subordinate or Cooperation Partner:
In many cases, sharing a content item with another user is required, e.g., in social networks, the 'friends' of my friend; in business networks, the subordinate or cooperation partner of the subscriber. In order to implement this functionality, proxy re-encryption can be used in this situation. Suppose, a subscriber A wants to share a content item with the 'cooperation partner' B. A generates re-encryption key and sends the re-encryption key to the proxy. Proxy re-encrypts the content stored in a router by using the reencryption key and sends the re-encrypted data to B. Then, the subscriber B can decrypt the re-encrypted data from the proxy with his own private key.
In summary, the contributions of our work can be listed as follows:
• We provide a detailed description of the application of our PRE scheme in ICN network. This PRE scheme incorporates PRE and ICN access framework and gives complete protocol. The security and privacy required by ICN network make this application of PRE a perfect match.
• Our proposal is secure against chosen ciphertext attack (RCCA) and chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure separately in complete ICN encryption using the standard model while still incorporating resistance to collusion attacks. Specifically, the subtleties required for RCCA security with PRE in ICN framework makes the implementation non-trivial.
• We demonstrate through experimental results that our scheme offers comparatively good performance in terms of computational cost and functionality in comparison with other classical PRE approaches. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section A reviews related work on PRE and ICN separately. Section II presents the underlying definitions, assumptions, system model, security model of our proposed schemes. Section III and Section IV describe our RCCA secure PRE schemes in ICN framework and its security proof respectively. Analysis and performance evaluation of the proposed solution is provided in Section V.
A. RELATED WORK
The conception of decryption right delegation was initially introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [9] in 1997. Instead of the traditional approach of ''decrypt then encrypt'', their scheme allows users to delegate decryption authority, with an increase in efficiency. Blaze et al. [8] extended Mambo's work and proposed an early form of PRE. In their scheme, with the help of a semi-trusted proxy, a ciphertext under Alice's public key can be converted to another ciphertext under Bob's public key. The proxy cannot obtain any information about the message in the process.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) has been widely applied as a resolvent method to many problems in past years, including cloud computing [10] , [28] , [30] , access control in file storage [11] , internet of thing [27] , [29] , [34] , [36] , email forwarding [12] , law enforcement [13] , and Personal Health Record (PHR) [14] .
Information-centric networking (ICN) emerges as a possible solution to solve the problem of privacy and security issues during content transformations and realize flexible access control. Gritter and Cheriton first proposed the idea of an information-centric model in their TRIAD project [15] . The ICN architectures leverage in-network storage for caching, multiparty communication through replication, and interaction models that decouple senders and receivers. Fotiou et al. present a survey of ICN [4] and claim scalability and privacy are remaining challenges that need to be addressed for the ICN ideas. Then, four representing approaches in ICN being actively developed: Data-Oriented Network Architecture [2] , Network of Information [16] , Named-data Networking [17] and Publish Subscribe Internet Technologies [18] .
With the ICN lower latency and congestion advantages, ICN plays important role in many environments, such as vehicular networks [38] , [40] , [41] , [33] , social network [37] , smart grid [42] , Internet of Things [43] - [45] . These schemes fully proved that ICN has wide adaptability and good prospects for research.
In the overhead and data delivery aspects, ICN also has unignored advantages. Li et al. [45] proposed an informationcentric Internet of Things approach to optimizing the coverage with lower costs by use of the ICN communication model. Magaia and Sheng [41] proposed an artificial immune system mechanism in ICN with low overhead. The incorporation of immune system mechanism and ICN reduce the detection time of system. In [38] , the authors insist that the challenging demand of vehicular networks can be meet by ICN framework. A high volume of critical data can be exchanged by the use of the ICN framework to improve the driving and traveling experience.
In order to solve security and privacy issues and improve the security of data transmission in ICN, many valuable attempts are made in the following schemes. The scheme [44] investigated the requirements of cybersecurity in ICN and analyzed the typical attack behaviors. In this scheme, Fang et al. proposed a fast and efficient trust management scheme for defending against the on-off attack in ICN. Wang et al. [42] also provided QoS (quality of services)-predicted energy efficient routing method for different information to minimizing the security risks in the information-centric smart grid. In [43] , a semantic and authorized search scheme was provided to protect data search security in ICN. Seetharam [39] provided an overview of caching and routing algorithms in ICN and described the state-ofthe art cache management and routing techniques in ICN. The authors also emphasize, ensuring content authenticity and privacy is important and yet largely unexplored problem. These schemes precisely prove that our research about security and privacy issues during data transformation is of great significance.
Some researches [19] - [21] are attempted to apply PRE to ICN framework. However, these schemes did not provide complete detailed standardized construction and security proof for the theory. Our scheme combines PBE with ICN and provides standardized construction security proof.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give a brief introduction to some basic foundational concepts and technologies used throughout this paper, and provide formal specifications for our system, security model.
A. BILINEAR MAPS
For two cyclic groups G and G T , with q denoting their prime order, we output the parameters (q, G, G T , e) for a bilinear map. Groups of prime order q are called bilinear map groups if there is a mapping e : G × G → G T with the following properties: 1) Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Z * q , and (g, g) ∈ G 2 , e(g a , g b ) = e (g, g) ab .
2) Non-degeneracy: ∀g = 1 G , there exists e(g, g) = 1 G T .
3) Computability: ∀g ∈ G, e(g, g) is efficiently computable.
B. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION
The 3-wDBDHI assumption for (q, G, G T , e) consists of the following definition: for an input tuple (g, g 1/a , g a , g (a 2 ) , g b , T ), the algorithm outputs 1 if T = e(g, g) b/a 2 and 0 otherwise. Adversary A's advantage in solving the 3-wDBDHI problem is defined as:
where T is an element randomly selected from G T . g ∈ G is given for some unknown 1/a, a, a 2 , b ∈ Z * q . If the 3-wDBDHI assumption holds true, there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A with a non-negligible advantage in solving the 3-wDBDHI problem.
The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption is the basis of our security. The DBDH assumption for (q, G, G T , e) consists of the following definition: for an input tuple (g, g a , g b , g c , T ), the algorithm outputs 1 if T = e(g, g) abc and 0 otherwise. Adversary A's advantage in solving the DBDH problem is defined as:
where T is an element randomly selected from G T . g ∈ G is given for some unknown a, b, c ∈ Z * q . If the DBDH assumption holds true, there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A with a non-negligible advantage in solving the DBDH problem.
C. ONE-TIME SIGNATURES Sig = (G, S, V) constructs a strongly unforgeable one-time (single use) signature. For input a security parameter λ, G outputs a one-time key pair (ssk, svk). For input m, V(δ, svk, m) outputs 1 whenever δ = S(ssk, m) and 0 otherwise.
Shamir's Secret Sharing is a form of secret sharing, where a secret is divided into shares, giving each participant its own unique share. To reconstruct the original secret, a minimum number of shares is required. In the threshold scheme this VOLUME 7, 2019 number is less than the total number of shares. Otherwise all participants are needed to reconstruct the original secret.
In this scheme, a secret is shared between n users in a way that at least (t + 1) ≤ n users have to combine their shares to obtain the secret. No combination of users less than t +1 (t +1 is termed the threshold) can decipher the secret. This scheme is implemented with the help of a one-dimensional t-degree
+· · ·+a t x t , which can be uniquely determined using any t +1 points on the polynomial. A user u i 's share is given by (
, where x i is a point on the X-axis and f (x i ) = p t (x i ). In Shamir's secret sharing scheme, generally the secret is the term a 0 in the polynomial. In our scheme, Shamir's Secret Sharing method is applied to help reduce the overhead on the user-side. The particulars are detailed in the Protocol 3 Enc.
E. SCHEME DEFINITION Our PRE scheme uses several algorithms as described here.
This algorithm is run by CP that, on input a security parameter κ, values of n and t, a prime number p, ZQrand(), E = {}, and a security parameter κ. This algorithm generates global public parameters par, a polynomial p t (x) with random coefficients a 0 , · · · , a t and the tuple T i for each user u i .
• Protocol 2 KeyGen (par) → (x A , X A ): Takes the public parameter par: {G, G T , g, g a 0 , u, v, Sig} as input, this algorithm generates a private key/public key (x A , X A ).
• Protocol 3 Enc(par, X A , a 0 , m) → (S 1 , S 2 ): Takes the public parameter par:
, data m ∈ G T as input, this algorithm generates enabling block S 1 and enabling block S 2 .
• Protocol 4 Registration(credentials) → T i : On input a user's registration credentials, this algorithm outputs a data packet containing u A 's unique valid share encrypted with X A .
• Protocol 5 Dec1(S 1 , T i ) → m: Run by anyone of n users, takes enabling block
Protocol 1 Setup
Input: Values of n < Q and t, a prime number q, ZQrand(), and E = {}, x GA , a security parameter κ. Output: Generates a polynomial p t (x) with random coefficients a 0 , · · · , a t , the tuple T i for each user u i and the public parameters par.
Generates p t (x) using the a i . 3. Calculates x j = ZQrand(), j = 0 to t − 1 and
{ Ensures x j s are positive, unique, and not reused for clients}
{ Calculation of each legitimate client's share follows. } 6. Calculates x i = ZQrand(), i = t to n+t −1, and
Given as input a security parameter κ, choose bilinear map groups (G, G T ), generators g, u, v ∈ G and a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme Sig = (G, S, V). This algorithm outputs the system's public parameters
Protocol 2 KeyGen (par)
Input: par:
• Protocol 6 ReKeyGen(T i , X B ) → RK : Run by user A, takes a delegator's private key T i in ICN and delegatee's public key X B as input, this algorithm generates the re-encryption key RK .
• Protocol 7 ReEnc(S 2 , RK ) → S R : On input a ciphertext encrypted under user public key X A , re-encryption key RK , this algorithm outputs the encrypted ciphertext S R . This algorithm is performed by the proxy.
• Protocol 8 Dec2
based on the user's public key X B , the user B 's private key x B , this algorithm outputs plaintext m. This process is performed by the user B. In addition, for any set of public parameters par, any plaintext message m ∈ G T , any Enc( par, E, ZQrand(), a 0 ,m)→ (S 2 ), this scheme needs to satisfy:
For any set of public parameters par, any plaintext message m ∈ G T , and when Enc( par, a 0 , m)→ (S 1 ), this scheme needs to satisfy:
Generates a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme Sig = (G, S, V). 4. Selects a one-time signature key pair (ssk, svk)
7. Sign S 1 , S 2 with private key sk cp of the CP.
Protocol 4 Registration
Input: User's registration credentials. 1. User u i creates a verifiable profile and successfully enters the system. 2. CP securely transmits the user's share (x i , f (x i )).
Protocol 5 Dec1
Input:
Verifies the sign of S 1 using provider's public key pk cp .
Calculates Lagrangian coefficient
Five types of entities are involved in our scheme: Content Provider (CP), Router, Subscribed Users, Proxy, Delegated Users.
If the relations hold, go to the next steps; otherwise, output ⊥ and halt.
∈ E e contained in S 2 .
Calculates its Lagrangian coefficient
Computes
The CP is the owner of data who encrypts and then shares content to the authorized users under Shamir's (t + 1, n)-threshold Secret Sharing algorithm, which allows t + 1 users to reconstruct the original secret by combining their shares. The details are listed below: (1) CP first generates a polynomial and evaluates the router's share and users' shares. The polynomial consists of the secret share (points) constant a 0 and users' shares. Each user's share is given to an authorized user as the secret key upon a successful registration. (2) Then, CP generates the enabling block by combining the encrypted message and authorized user's share, in which the encrypted message is generated by CP using Shamir's Secret polynomial secret constant a 0 . At the same time, enabling block is signed by the CP to guarantee provenance. (3) Finally, the enabling block is sent to the router.
2) ROUTER
Upon receiving the enabling block, the router caches and forwards it to the authorized user. A key component of ICN VOLUME 7, 2019 is to cache content at storage-enabled routers. By caching content at in-network routers, network performance can be improved by delivering content from routers closer to the user and not from the origin servers (content custodians).
3) SUBSCRIBED USERS
A first-time user registers with the CP to get his credentials (user's share) and can obtain data from proximal nodes or the CP. (1) The user first sends a registration interest to the CP. The registration interest is encrypted with CP's public key and signed by the user's private key. (2) The CP then replies to the user with a data packet containing user's unique valid share encrypted with the user's public key. The reply is unicast from the CP to the user and is not cached at intermediate routers. (3) After successful registration, the subscribed user can receive the enabling block from the router which contains the encrypted message. (4) Another situation is when the subscribed user wants to delegate other normal users to read his (her) encrypted message, the subscribed user only needs to send a re-encryption key to the proxy.
4) PROXY
The proxy re-encrypts the enabling block using the re-encryption key and delivers the re-encrypted data into the specific receiver who can decrypt out the data with his own secret key.
5) DELEGATED USERS
The delegated user can decrypt the re-encrypted data (enabling block) from the proxy with his own private key.
G. SECURITY MODEL
We also define some important terms for our model.
Honest Public Key. If a secret key for a public key cannot be revealed to any adversary, the public key is called the honest public key. We define HU as a set of all the honest parties, including target user that is assigned the target public key.
Corrupt Public Key. If an adversary can attack or compromise a private key for a public key, the public key is called a corrupt public key. We define CU as a set of all the corrupt public keys.
Definition 1: A PRE scheme in ICN framework is CCA secure if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary
A wins the following game with a non-negligible advantage. In this game, A is the adversary, and C is the challenger.
• Init. Adversary A selects the challenge x * GA and sends them to C.
• Setup. The public key and public parameter is constructed as follows.
Note that we don't know the constant coefficient of f (x i ) since b is unknown. The public key of a set of subscribers is g x GA , and the secret key is (x i , f (x i )).
• Phase1. A sends a series of inquiries to C, and C responds as follows. The adversary A is given access to the following oracles. • Setup : Challenger C calls Protocol 1 Setup (n, t, p, ZQrand(), E = {}, κ) → (par, p t (x), T i ) and sends par to A. In what follows, we use the index i, i ∈ {t, · · · , n + t − 1} and index j to represent the user A and the user B.
• Phase1. A sends a series of inquiries to C, and C responds as follows. = e(X A , C 4 ), V (C 1 , δ 0 , (C 3 , C 4 )) = 1 are not satisfied. Otherwise, the plaintext is returned to A.
• Challenge: A sends two different messages m 0 and m 1 to C, m 0 and m 1 are brief and of equal length, C gives the challenge ciphertext S * R to A, where the S * R ← Protocol 7 ReEnc(Enc(par, X A , a 0 , m d ), RK ).
• Phase2. A continues enquiring the above oracles.
- 
III. THE PRE SCHEME IN THE ICN
In this paper, we use Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) to provide confidentiality and access control for content items shared over ICN, realizing secure content delegation among a sets of users.
In this ICN-PRE scheme, the content provider allows a set of subscribed users to access and use the cached content directly. At the same time, this access process does not need a verification from an online provider authentication. However, this convenient access method is only limited to subscribed users. When a subscribed user is working outside or having holiday, he needs to share his encrypted file or delegate his decryption rights to a specified normal user (subordinate or cooperation partner).
A. BASIC CONSTRUCTION
Here we describe a scheme supporting proxy re-encryption in the ICNs framework.
In the ICNs, seven protocols are presented including the generation of polynomial/user sharers, generation and encryption of enabling block, user registration, secret extraction, re-encryption key generation, re-encryption, decryption aspects.
The CP generates the polynomial p t (x) and calculates the tuple (T i ) = (x i , f (x i )) for each legitimate user u i . In order to prevent confusion, in what follows, we use the index i to represent the users' shares and index j to present the router's sharers as in fig 2. 
1) GENERATION OF POLYNOMIAL/USER SHARERS AT THE PROVIDER
The procedure for generation of the polynomial p t (x) is presented in Protocol1, and the degree of the polynomial is t.
In line 1-2, the content provider generates t + 1 random number {a 0 , · · · a t }. Then, the content provider generates polynomials p t (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + a 2 x 2 + · · · + a t x t with coefficients a i , i ∈ {0, · · · , t}. The constant term a 0 is a secret value which is only can be obtained when t + 1 values (x i , p t (x i )), i ∈ {0, · · · , t} are equipped simultaneously.
In Lines 3-5, the content provider generates router's share by identifying t random points on p t (x). Router's share is regarded as a public key that every subscriber can obtain in ICN access framework.
In Lines 6-7, the content provider generates the n subscribers' shares using n other points. Every subscriber possesses a unique share as his private key. Provider will send users' shares to every subscriber directly. The dissemination of the subscribers' share will happen in the User Registration Protocol (Protocol 3).
2) GENERATION OF KEY PAIR
Protocol 4 presents the KeyGen procedure in the scheme. Subscriber and non-subscribers obtain their key pair through this protocol, and their key pair can be used in encryption and re-encryption procedure.
3) GENERATION AND ENCRYPTION OF ENABLING BLOCK
In the ICN framework, the protocol is divided into two parts according to two situations for content sharing: the content access part (Protocol 3-Protocol 5) contains the CP, router and a set of subscribed users. CP provides content VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. System Model.
and then caches the content in a router. Next, the router transmits cached data through broadcast encryption [32] . Finally, every user decrypts encrypted content by his share; The re-encryption part (Protocol 6-Protocol 8) contains the proxy, router, delegator (a subscribed user who need to delegate decrypt right) and delegate. The detail will be introduced in following.
The broadcast encryption scheme is based on Lagrangian theorem. In the broadcast encryption, the provider generates users' share by Lagrangian theorem. In addition, every user also possesses a public key in proxy re-encryption process.
Protocol 2 deals with the generation of the enabling block, which enables the legitimate user to extract the message m, and is delivered to the user as one of the first content packets.
By generating a random number (Line 1), the provider obtains the encrypted message M using the group generator g, subscribers group label x GA and polynomial constant a 0 in Line 2.
In Line 3, the provider computes (partial Lagrangian coefficients), this precalculated is used at the client for calculating the complete Lagrangian coefficients needed for decryption. The partial Lagrangian coefficients are stored in router can be obtained by every subscribed user. When a subscribed user wants to decrypt the content, he can combine the partial Lagrangian coefficients with their own share. Thus, our framework is computation-heavy at the server side, which results in lightweight computations at the clients.
In Line 5, the CP generates enabling block S C . It contains the encrypted message M , the group generator with an exponentiation operation g r , the partial Lagrangian coefficients , and router's share E e . The enabling block S C is signed by the server (Line 6) to guarantee provenance.
4) NEW USER REGISTRATION
Protocol 3 deals with registration of a new user in our ICN-PRE scheme. For registration, a user u A (assume user A) sends a registration interest to the CP. This interest contains u A 's credentials, encrypted with P cp (CP's public key) and signed by sk A (u A 's private key). The CP then replies to u A with a data packet containing u A 's unique valid share encrypted with X A . The reply is unicast from the CP to u A and is not cached at intermediate routers. Even if the data is cached by a malicious router communication secrecy cannot be undermined.
5) SECRET EXTRACTION AT THE USER
Protocol 4 presents the decryption procedure in the scheme of ICN without PRE. Before decrypting the content and extracting the message m, the user u i have to verify the signature of S C (Line 1) that he has obtained along with the content.
As per Definition 3.1, the k th Lagrangian coefficient λ k is defined as 0≤j =k≤t
, where 0 ≤ j, k ≤ t − 1 represent the indices of the server shares and are in S C ; the t th fraction is x i obtained from user u i .
The server precomputed (part of S 1 ) is used to obtain complete Lagrangian coefficients, thus reducing the computation time at the client significantly.
User u i simply calculates the last term (
, to obtain the k th Lagrangian coefficient by performing only one
, instead of t multiplications. This precomputation enables the framework's to use in mobile devices.
The following steps obtain the parameters used for the decryption. Line 3 calculates δ 1 the multiplication of the shares (e(g λ k , g rf (x k ) ), ∀f (x k ) ∈ E e ) in S C raised to their corresponding Lagrangian coefficients (λ k ). i The client calculates the Lagrangian coefficient of his share in Line 4 and derives δ 2 through the same procedure as Line 3 (in Line 5).
In Line 6 the client calculates the message m.
6) GENERATION OF RE-ENCRYPTION KEY AT THE SUBSCRIBED USER A
The above scenario has only considered the data sharing between the server and subscribed users. If one subscribed user Alice works outside or on a vacation, she may want her colleague Bob to manage her encrypted working files.
To collaborate with Alice, Bob also wants to access Alice's received data. However, Alice's data has been encrypted by the broadcast encryption in ICN framework and Alice or other subscribed users would not like to decrypt and then encrypt the data to Bob. Alternatively, a more desirable method is to build an elegant re-encryption approach to process the previously encrypted data so that it is also decryptable by Bob. Then the subscribed user A only needs to generate a re-encryption key RK and send it to the proxy server. It is worth noting that the re-encryption key can be generated using subscribed user A's private key T i and delegated user B's public key X B , which means that the subscribed user could choose the intended recipient and generate the corresponding re-encryption key herself.
7) SECRET RE-ENCRYPTION AT THE PROXY
The semi-trusted proxy convert a subscribed user A's ciphertext encrypted in broadcast encryption to a delegate B's ciphertext encrypted in public key without learning anything about the underlying plaintext. Hence, in our ICN-PRE scheme, one can take advantage of broadcast encryption in the ICN to securely share data with a set of recipients, and then incorporate an additional one into the subscribed user set through the re-encryption mechanism, without decrypting the BE ciphertext nor leaking any sensitive information.
This algorithm is run by semi-trusted proxy, the subscribed user A's encrypted data S c , and re-encryption key RK are provided as input. The proxy embeds the user B's public key X B in Lagrangian coefficient, and generates re-encryption ciphertext S R . In addition, the proxy server cannot obtain the message contents during the transformation, and it is impossible for delegate and the proxy to recover the subscribed user's private key separately or together.
8) DECRYPTION AT THE USER B
After the re-encrypted data S R is transformed by the proxy server with the re-encryption key, Bob can decrypt the data directly by using his private key. Proof 1: Suppose that there is an adversary A can break the CCA security of our scheme, Then we can construct an algorithm C to solve DBDH problem based on A. Let G = g , g a , g b , g c , T to modify the DBDH problem. We construct an algorithm C to decide whether T = e(g, g) abc .
IV. SECURITY PROOF
• Init. Adversary A selects the challenge x * G and sends them to C.
• Setup. The public key and public parameter is constructed as follows. Select three polynomials f 0 (
• Phase1. A sends a series of inquiries to C, and C responds as follows. The adversary A is given access to the following oracles. Key generation oracle O sk (GA): For an input a group GA, C first checks whether GA ? = GA * . If the condition are true, C outputs ⊥ and aborts. Otherwise, C random chooses x i ∈ Z * q , and returns the private key 
GA , it is identical to Phase1. Otherwise, C outputs ⊥ and aborts.
• Guess. Notice that, when T = e(g, g) abc , the S * 1 equals Protocol 3 → S * 1 =< M , g r , , E e >, where r = c, a 0 = a, x GA = b. In contrast, if T ∈ G T at random, m d is perfectly hidden, so A cannot guess d with better probability than 1/2. When A eventually outputs the g) abc , or T is a random generator of G T . Theorem 2: Assuming the strong unforgeability of the onetime signature, the scheme is RCCA-secure at re-encryption ciphertext under the 3-wDBDHI assumption.
Proof 2:
, B = g b , T ) be a modified 3-wDBDHI instance. We construct an algorithm C deciding whether T = e(g, g) b/a 2 out of a successful RCCA adversary A.
• Setup : In what follows, we use the index i, i ∈ {t, · · · , n + t − 1} and index j to represent the user A and the user B.
In a preparation phase, C generates a one-time signature key pair (ssk * , svk * ) ← (λ) and provides A with public parameters including u = A
1 . In the following, we define HU as a set of honest users, including user i * that is assigned the target public key pk * = X i * = A
, and CU as a set of corrupted users. Throughout the game, A's environment is simulated as follows.
• Phase1. A sends a series of inquiries to C, and C responds as follows. Key generation oracle O x i (X i ): public keys of honest users i ∈ HU \{i * } are defined as X i = A x i 1 = g ax i for a randomly chosen x i . The target user's public key is set as
The key pair of a corrupt user i ∈ CU is set as (X i = g x i , x i ), for a random x i r ← Z * q , so that (X i , x i ) can be given to A. ReKey generation oracle O rk (T i , X j ): To generate re-encryption keys RK from player i to player j, C has to distinguish several situations:
} which is a valid re-encryption key.
-If i = i * and j ∈ HU \{i * }, C responds with
} that has also the correct distribution.
} which is also computable. Re-encryption oracle O re (S 2 , RK ): When facing a re-encryption query from user i to user j, B returns 'invalid' if relations e(C 2 , u C 1 · v) ? = e(X A , C 4 ) and V (C 1 , δ 0 , (C 3 , C 4 )) = 1 are not satisfied.
-If i = i * or if i = i * and j ∈ CU \{i * }, C simply re-encrypts using the re-encryption key RK which is available in either case.
-If i = i * and j ∈ CU , 1. If C 1 = svk * , C outputs 'invalid' and halts. 2. We are thus left with the case C 1 = svk * , i = i * and j ∈ CU . Knowing user private key x j , C computes
For an input private key x j and a ciphertext S R , it produces a plaintext message m received from Protocol 7.
-
1 . The validity of the ciphertext ensures e(g, A −1 ) = e(g, g) 1/a and
then obtain e(g, g) rx GA a 0 = (e(g, g)
e(g,g) rx GA a 0 .
• Challenge: When she decides that the first phase is over, = d * and that T is random otherwise.
• Phase2. A continues enquiring the above oracles but with the follow restrictions. Decryption oracle oracle O de (S R , x j ): if the C 1 in S R equals svk * , C outputs ⊥ and aborts. Otherwise, it is the same to Phase1.
• Guess. Notice that, when T = e(g, g) b/a 2 , the S * R =< C A = (C * 1 , C * 2 , C * 3 , C * 4 , C * 5 , C * 6 , δ 0 , g r > equals ReEnc(S c , RK ), where r = b/a 2 . In contrast, if T ∈ G T at random, M d is perfectly hidden, so A cannot guess d with better probability than 1/2. When A eventually outputs the result d , if d = d * , C decides that T = e(g, g) b/a 2 , or T is a random generator of G T .
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Several representative PRE schemes are compared in terms of properties, computation cost and communication complexity in Table 2, 3 and Table 4 respectively.
We first compare some important properties between our scheme and other PRE schemes. The comparison includes security, stand model or random oracle model, hard problem and collusion-resistance. These properties are listed for each method in Table 2 . Here, ' √ ' indicates the scheme satisfy the property, '×' indicates the scheme does not satisfy the property. In Table 2 , 'weak' means that the proxy cannot obtain the delegator's private key but the underlying encrypted message through the collusion attacks.
Each PRE scheme is proposed to be suitable for different application scenarios. The ciphertext in our scheme cannot be re-encrypted many times since the multi-use property in the ICN framework is not secure for subscribers to control his own data.
In Table 3 , we denote by t p a pairing operation, by t s a scalar multiplication in G 1 , by t e a exponentiation in G 2 ; Sig and Ver denote the one-time signature and verification, respectively; k, k 1 and k 2 denote a security parameter, the bit-length of {0, 1} k 1 and {0, 1} k 2 , respectively;
In Table 4 , |G|, |G 1 |, |G 2 | and |Z p | denote the bit-length of an element in G, G 1 , G 2 and Z p , respectively; |k s | and |σ s | denote the bit-length of one-time signing key and signature;
|T | denotes the bit-length of the timestamp; |M | denotes the bit-length of message m ∈ M ; |SymEnc| denotes the bit-length of the one-time symmetric encryption ciphertext; |N |, |N x | and |N y | denote the safe-prime modulus; RO and ST denote the random oracle model and the standard model, respectively. i In the both of Table 3 and Table 4 , we use t to calculate the number of router's share. In ICN, the number of router's share depend on the provider. Every subscriber in ICN needs to combine the router's share with user's unique share to decrypt the ciphertext. This function allows legitimate users to access and use the cached content directly without verification/authentication by an online provider.
Although the computation cost of bilinear pairing is happened in 'Enc', 'Dec' and 'ReEnc', the complex computation is only heavy at the server side. This results in lightweight computations at the clients, and the overall function in ICN is worthy.
